FORUM: General Assembly II

QUESTION OF: Preventing the Use of Biological Weapons in Military Actions

MAIN-SUBMITTED BY: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

CO-SUBMITTED BY: The United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Russia

## THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY II,

Acknowledging the progress made on the issue by the United Nations through conventions such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,

*Recognizing* that additional work is needed to address the topic,

*Defining* items of relevance in terms of biological weapons as harmful biological agents, such as a pathogenic microorganism or neurotoxin, used as a weapon to cause death or disease, usually on a large scale,

Alarmed that more than 15 countries, including the United States, currently own or are suspected of owning biological weapons,

- 1. <u>Calls</u> upon relevant parties to ratify the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) if not done so already;
- 2. <u>Requests</u> the Eight-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reinforce the BWC so that the BWC can prevent the use of biological weapons from the military actions in more effective ways such as but not limited to:
  - a. adding punishments in the BWC such as:
    - i. consequences for countries that use biological weapons,
    - ii. sentencing those who are involved with the use of biological and toxin warfare with appropriate punishment, whether that be detention or alternative penalization,
  - b. increasing or modifying the articles in the treaty to make more countries sign for BWC such as modifying article I by adding to never use biological weapons along with others;
- 3. <u>Urges</u> countries to consider the possible humanitarian and ethical impacts of biological warfare such as:
  - a. harms caused to civilian and innocent populations in their use,
  - b. damages wrought onto the environment as a long-term effect,
  - c. possibility of disease and biological factors to spread out of control;

- 4. <u>Recommends</u> nations consider the drawbacks of using biological and toxin weapons, including but not limited to:
  - a. the unpredictability of such weaponry; for example, the airborne toxin, which is known to spread to areas previously unaccounted for, and to affect friendly troops,
  - b. the long-term effects of some of these toxins, such as anthrax, an infectious, often fatal disease of cattle, sheep, and other mammals caused by Bacillus anthracis, transmitted to humans through contaminated wool, raw meat, or other animal products, which can live in soil for around 50 years, infecting people long after its initial use,
  - c. the ineffectiveness of this mode of warfare, as many studies show that often 1% to 10% of the general population is naturally immune to most biological compounds used in germ warfare;
- 5. <u>Supports</u> systems being set up, in order to enforce the accountability of participant countries to uphold the guidelines and limitations set by established agreements such as the BWC, which include ways such as but not limited to:
  - a. possible check-ins from organizations such as the United Nations General Assembly First Committee in order to confirm that nations are adhering to the agreed-upon guidelines and limitations,
  - b. networks of communication lines, such as hotline centers, being set up in order to allow for sources to safely and anonymously deliver possible information about activity surrounding biological and toxin weapons,
  - c. educational programs in the countries that have or are suspected of having biological weapons regarding the dangers of biological and toxin warfare and the importance of the prevention of such tactics in military action;
    - i. targeting the people in power, who will be those deciding their country's stance on the topic,
    - ii. participating in schools of higher levels so as to teach people from a young age but still at a time in their life when they are old enough to understand the severity of the topic;
- 6. <u>Strongly encourages</u> nations to work alongside non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to develop and fund programs, such as the ones mentioned above, and expand their reach to the general public without having to rely solely on governmental resources and funding which may not be readily available.